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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Albert Moore appeals from the district court's denial of his I.C.R. 35(a)
motion to correct an illegal sentence.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In State v. Moore, 152 Idaho 203, _ , 268 P.3d 471, 471-472 (Ct. App.
2011 ), the Idaho Court of Appeal described the prior proceedings in Moore's
underlying cases and appeals as follows:
In two cases filed in 2006 and 2007, Moore was charged
with driving under the influence (DUI). In each case, the charge
was enhanced to a felony pursuant to Idaho Code§ 18-8005(5) on
grounds that Moore had twice previously been convicted of DUI
within the preceding ten years, including a conviction in North
Dakota. In both Idaho DUI cases, Moore challenged the State's
reliance on the North Dakota conviction on the contentions that it
did not qualify as a "substantially conforming foreign criminal
conviction" under Idaho Code § 18-8005(5) (footnote omitted), and
that the conviction was constitutionally defective. After the district
court denied Moore's motion to dismiss the present case on either
basis, Moore entered a conditional guilty plea. His plea reserved
the right to appeal several of the district court's rulings, including
the court's rejection of Moore's challenge to the State's use of the
North Dakota conviction. The district court entered a judgment of
conviction imposing a unified sentence of six years, with one year
fixed.
In Moore's other DUI case, he pleaded not guilty and went to
trial. In that trial, the district court admitted evidence of the North
Dakota DUI conviction over Moore's objection that it was not a
substantially conforming foreign criminal conviction, that the
Wyoming conviction was constitutionally defective, and that the
documentary evidence of that conviction was not properly
authenticated. Moore appealed in both cases.
The two appeals were consolidated and addressed by this
Court in State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 231 P.3d 532 (Ct App.
2010). We affirmed the district court's determination that the North
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Dakota DUI conviction was "substantially conforming" and that
Moore had not shown that conviction to be constitutionally
defective. These rulings rejected the challenges to use of the North
Dakota conviction that Moore had made before the district court in
this case. However, we also vacated the judgment of conviction in
his other DUi case because the documentary evidence of the North
Dakota conviction was not properly authenticated and therefore had
been wrongly admitted at trial. J!h at 892-99, 231 P.3d at 537-44.
In that appeal, Moore contended that he and the district
court had "agreed" at the change of plea hearing in the present
case that his guilty plea could be set aside if he obtained any
appellate relief in the other case regarding the North Dakota
conviction. He argued that because this Court had determined that
documentary evidence of the North Dakota conviction was wrongly
admitted at trial in the other case due to lack of proper
authentication, the present case should be remanded for "further
proceedings as intended by the district court." & at 903-04, 231
P .3d at 548-49. Because ambiguous statements made at Moore's
change of plea hearing concerning the scope of the reserved issue
left open this possibility, we remanded this case 'for proceedings
consistent with our opinion and the Rule 11 plea agreement." & at
904, 231 P.3d at 549.
On remand, the district court determined that the
reservations in Moore's conditional guilty plea were not as broad as
Moore contended in that he did not reserve a right to relief from his
guilty plea if the Court of Appeals found evidentiary trial error in the
other case. The district court therefore effectively denied Moore's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Perhaps so that Moore would
have a written document from which to appeal, the district court
stated its intent to enter an amended judgment which would
"impose the sentence as earlier set out in the Court's judgment."
Later in the same hearing, the district court said that it would
"impose the sentence of one year fixed, four years indeterminate
for five years," which was not an accurate statement of the original
sentence. On June 11, 2010, the amended judgment of conviction
was entered, stating a unified sentence of five years, with one year
fixed. Moore did not appeal, and neither did the State.
On September 10, 2010, the State filed a motion to amend
the judgment of conviction a second time to "correct an apparent
clerical mistake." The State pointed out that the original judgment
of conviction imposed a unified sentence of six years, with one year
fixed and that because at the hearing on remand the district court
had stated its intent to "impose" that sentence again, its amended
2

judgment of conviction stating a unified sentence of five years, with
one year fixed, was a mistake. Over Moore's protestations, the
district court agreed that it had made a clerical mistake correctable
under Idaho Criminal Rule 36, and entered a second amended
judgment of conviction expressed a unified sentence of six years,
with one year fixed. Moore appeals.
(Footnotes omitted.)
On appeal from the second amended judgment, Moore asserted that the
district court's oral pronouncement of a five-year unified sentence controlled, and
the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the second amended judgment of conviction.
Moore, 152 Idaho 203, _

268 P.3d at 472-473. However, The Idaho Court of

Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court had no intent to make a
substantive change to the sentence already in place, and that I.C.R. 36
authorized the court to correct its error. -Id. at - -, 268 P.3d at 472-474.
Several months later, Moore filed a pro se I.C.R. 35(a) motion to correct
an illegal sentence in his 2006 DUI case.

(R., pp.10-18.)

In this motion, it

appears Moore alleged: (1) the district court's second amended judgment and its
correction of his prior erroneous oral pronouncement constituted an ex post facto
violation and was precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel; (2) his
conviction was the result of vindictive prosecution and a biased trial judge; and
(3) and that his speedy trial rights were violated. (Id.) Rather than request that
his sentence be "corrected" Moore asked the district court to vacate his
conviction. (R., pp.17-18.) The district court denied the motion without comment
or hearing. (R., p.10.) Moore timely appealed. (R., pp.62-65.)
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Moore states the

[1.J

Illegal Sentence

[2.J

Preclusion

[3.]

Ex Post Facto

[4.J

Use of improperly authenticated judgment by appellate court
ruling used by district court [sic]

(Appellant's brief, 1 p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Moore failed to show the district court erred in denying his I.C.R.
35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence?

1

Moore filed his Appellant's brief on June 6, 201 prior to the filing of the clerk's
record. (See Appellant's brief; 6/6/12 Idaho Supreme Court Notice.) Once the
clerk's record was filed, the Idaho Supreme Court accepted Moore's previously
filed Appellant's brief, and set a due date for the ming of the Respondent's brief.
(7/16/12 Idaho Supreme Court Notice). Moore subsequently filed a second
Appellant's brief on August 17, 2012, without first seeking leave of the Court.
(Second Appellant's brief.) This second Appellant's brief contains similar
arguments to those contained in Moore's first Appellant's brief.
Contemporaneously with the filing of this Respondent's brief, the state is filing a
motion to strike Moore's Second Appellant's brief.
4

ARGUMENT
Moore Has Faiied To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His LC.R. 35(a)
Motion To Correct An Illegal Sentence
Introduction
Moore contends that the district court erred in denying his !.C.R. 35(a)
motion to correct an illegal sentence.

(See generally, Appellant's brief.)

However, Moore's I.C.R. 35(a) motion was frivolous because, rather than assert
that his felony DUI sentence was illegal from the face of the record, Moore
utilized his I.C.R. 35(a) motion to attempt to assert challenges to his conviction,
and to re-assert his previously adjudicated claim that the district court erred by
entering a second amended judgment of conviction to correct a clerical error. On
appeal, Moore simply attempts again to raise these same issues.

B.

Moore's I.C.R. 35(a) Motion Was Frivolous
Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) is a narrow rule that allows a trial court to

correct a sentence that is illegal from the face of the record any time. State v.
Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 84, 218 P.3d 1143, 1145 (2009). Whether a sentence
is illegal is a question of law that is freely reviewed by the court on appeal.

kl

An illegal sentence under I.C.R. 35(a) is one in excess of a statutory provision or
otherwise contrary to applicable law. State v. Alsanea, 138 Idaho 733, 745, 69
P.3d 153, 165 (Ct. App. 2003).
Moore's I.C.R. 35(a) motion was frivolous because it did not allege that his
sentence was illegal from the face of the record.

Instead, Moore utilized his

!.C.R. 35(a) motion to attempt to raise new challenges to his underlying
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conviction, and to re-assert a previously adjudicated challenge to the district
court's utilization of I.C.R. 36 to correct a clerical error. (R., pp.10-18.) These
arguments, and Moore's requested relief of the vacating of his conviction, are
beyond the narrow scope of I.C.R. 35(a).
Further, even if Moore's challenge to the district court's second amended
judgment of conviction was within the scope of LC.R. 35(a), this claim is
precluded by the doctrine of res judicata.
Any claims asserted and finally decided in an appeal are barred by res
judicata in a subsequent appeal. Beasley v. State, 126 Idaho 356, 363, 883 P.2d
714, 721 (Ct. App. 1994). The doctrine of res judicata prevents re-litigation of
issues that have been previously decided in a final judgment or decision in an
action between the same litigants. State v. Rhoades, 134 Idaho 862, 863, 11
P.3d 481, 482 (2000); Gubler v. Brydon, 125 Idaho 107, 110, 867 P.2d 981, 984
(1994) (res judicata "prevents the litigation of causes of action which were finally
decided in a previous suit"). It includes both claim preclusion (true res judicata)
and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel), such that a valid final judgment
rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a
subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim or issue.
Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 256, 668 P .2d 130, 132 (Ct. App. 1983); see
Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 146,150,804 P.2d 319,323 (1990)
(citing from Joyce v. Murphy Land Co., 35 Idaho 549, 208 P. 241 (1922)), cited in
Kraft v. State, 100 Idaho 671,673,603 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1979). Furthermore, it
has long been the law that a principle or rule of law decided on appeal becomes
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the law of the case, which

be adhered

in

future proceedings in that

case. Combes v. State, Industrial Special lndem. Fund, 135 Idaho 505, 509, 20
P.3d 689, 693 {2000).

268 P.3d at 471-472, Moore asserted that the
district court lacked authority to enter a second amended judgment in his 2006
DUI case.

However, the Court of Appeals held that I.C.R. 36 authorized the

court to enter the judgment to correct a clerical error.

Id.

Moore is therefore

precluded from raising this issue again.
Moore has failed to show that any of the issues he attempted to raise in
his I.C.R. 35(a) motion were within the scope of that rule. He has therefore failed
to show that the district court erred in denying his motion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this court affirm the district court's
denial of Moore's I.C.R 35(a) motion.
DATED this 9th day of October 2012

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th day of October 2012, I caused two
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRI
OF RESPONDENT to be placed
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
t

ALBERT R. MOORE
!DOC #90125
SIC! N.D. D1
Box 8509
Boise, ID 83707

Mark W. Olson
Deputy Attorney General
MWO/pm
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